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AN END TO "DIVIDE AND CONQUER"?
EU MAY MOVE TOWARD MORE UNITED
APPROACH IN NEGOTIATING "OPEN SKIES"
AGREEMENTS WITH USA
THOMAS D. GRANT*
AN ERA OF bilateral air transport agreements between the
United States and individual European Union Member
States-along with the benefits this brought the American air
transport industry-may well have just witnessed the beginning
of its end. Countries party to the European Treaty have been
ceding more and more of what was once thought of as inaliena-
ble "sovereign" competence to the super-national Community.
This process of entrusting important responsibilities to the Brus-
sels-based European Commission was by the early 1990s already
well advanced in the dimension of intra-Community affairs.
Now, however, the EU seems to be poised to take a major step
toward "pooling" the competence of its Member States on mat-
ters of external affairs, at least in the commercially vital and po-
litically sensitive realm of civil air transport. In the first instance
this will be done mainly by identifying matters of internal com-
petence that give rise to "parallel" external competences; how-
ever, a direct and even more xsubstantial power appropriation
by the EU over foreign trade policy may be in the offing.
On January 31, 2002, Advocate General Antonio Tizzano of
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) delivered an opinion the
("Opinion") in a series of cases brought by the Commission
against the United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, Finland,
Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria, and Germany for alleged in-
fringements of the Community's exclusive competence in mat-
ters concerning regulation of air transport with non-EU
* Thomas D. Grant, Warburg Research Fellow at St. Anne's College, Oxford
University, is a member of the bars of Massachusetts, New York, and District of
Columbia, graduated the Yale Law School in 1994, and holds a Ph.D. in
international law from the University of Cambridge.
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members ("third countries").' Opinions of the Advocate Gen-
eral serve as guidance to the ECJ and generally offer the parties
and the public a preview of the final decision-or at least of the
areas of chief focus ahead.
The Opinion, in addition to carrying implications for the con-
stitutional structure of the EU, may well herald a new chapter in
EU-U.S. relations on matters of air transport.
I. SUPERPOWER NEGOTIATES WITH LESSER LIGHTS
The Commission, executive organ of the EU (or "Commu-
nity" for short), throughout the 1990s sought a mandate to form
treaties with the United States on behalf of all the EU Member
States in the matter of air transport agreements. Such agree-
ments are vital to the air transport industry. Under the Chicago
Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944, every sover-
eign jurisdiction has the exclusive right to permit (or deny) for-
eign air carriers access to its air space.2 International air
commerce therefore rests on agreements between countries set-
ting forth where and how often one another's air carriers may
operate.
The United States has long enjoyed a formidable advantage in
the negotiation of air transport agreements. The United States,
under a single jurisdiction, possesses the largest market in the
world for air transport services. For virtually every airline in the
world operating long haul international services, access to that
market is a coveted prize. The smaller internal markets of coun-
tries like Japan, the Netherlands, or the United Kingdom pre-
sent far less tempting a prospect to American air carriers.
However, access to landing slots on international routes into
those countries and rights to use those slots in as liberal a fash-
ion as possible are goals American air carriers do very much
seek.' The United States has thus been able to negotiate bilat-
I Joined Cases C-466/98 (Comm'n v. United Kingdom), C-467/98 (Comm'n v.
Denmark), C-468/98 (Comm'n v. Sweden), C-469/98 (Comm'n v. Finland), C-471/98
(Comm'n v. Belgium), C-472/98 (Comm'n v. Luxembourg), C-475/98 (Comm'n v.
Austria), and C-476/98 (Comm'n v. Germany), 2002 E.C.R. 0 (2002) (Opinion of
the Advocate General Tizzano) [hereinafter Tizzano Opinion].
2 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat.
180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295.
3 I discussed some of these matters at an earlier stage in the history of EU-
United States air transport relations. See Thomas D. Grant, Foreign Takeovers of
United States Airlines: Free Trade Process, Problems, and Process, 31(1) HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 63-151 (1994) (including recommendation to pursue more "Open Skies"
agreements with European countries).
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eral air transport agreements that pry open access to many mar-
kets for American air carriers, while ceding relative crumbs to
air carriers of the counter-parties to the agreements, or so the
European Commission has complained.
In the Commission's view, the final straw was the conclusion
of a series of separate "Open Skies" agreements with individual
EU Member States.4 The Commission repeatedly had asked the
Council, a high-level policy-making body consisting of the gov-
ernments of the Member States meeting at ministerial level, to
grant it a mandate to take over all air transport negotiations with
the United States, and thus prevent this patchwork approach.5
The Council declined to do so, granting the Commission a man-
date to deal only with certain limited aspects of EU-United
States aviation relations. Moreover, the Council explicitly stated
that it did not wish to extend the mandate to the full scope of
competences the Commission had sought.
Member States, in the absence of Community activity on the
matter of negotiating air transport agreements with the United
States, began negotiations individually and on a bilateral basis.
A number of agreements between the United States and individ-
ual Member States resulted. These arguably reflected the supe-
rior position of a continental superpower bargaining with small-
and medium-sized countries and achieved a sweeping liberaliza-
tion of the air transport markets between the United States and
the Member States party to the agreements. The most valuable
provision that the United States achieved in its bilateral negotia-
tions is the so-called "Fifth Freedom"-the right to operate air
services from one country to a second country and then on to a
third, with the freedom to pick up passengers in the second
country.6 When the second and third stops on the route are
both Member States of the Community, the Fifth Freedom
4 The expression "Open Skies" was given substance in U.S. Department of
Transportation Order No. 92-8-13 (1992) (In the Matter of Defining "Open Skies").
The Order established the model that U.S. air transport negotiators have sought
to implement in bilateral agreements.
5 The Commission has been persistent in this, pursuing the mandate while
also litigating the "Open Skies" matter. Loyola de Palacio, the Commissioner re-
sponsible for transport, stated in March 2001 that she was confident the Council
would grant a full negotiating mandate to the Commission by June of that year.
Reuters, March 23, 2001. E.U. Transport, Energy Chief Meets U.S. Counterparts,
DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Mar. 23, 2001.
6 Five "freedoms of the air" were proposed by the Canadian delegation to the
1944 Chicago Conference. ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAw: CASES AND
MATERIALS 2-6 (1981).
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amounts to a license to carry out internal flights within the Com-
munity.7 Such license-akin to permission for "cabotage" (car-
riage of goods or passengers from point to point within one
jurisdiction) -is a prerogative that sovereigns historically
guarded with utmost jealousy. Among the seven Member States
with which the United States concluded "Open Skies" agree-
ments (Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Aus-
tria, and Germany), the United States secured its air carriers this
Fifth Freedom and thus, in the Commission's view, a major in-
road to the intra-Community market in air transport services.
A further provision that the United States was able to secure,
again in the Commission's view owing to the superior leverage it
possesses as a superpower dealing with lightweights and welter-
weights, is a set of "nationality" clauses. Each agreement con-
tains a nationality clause, following a similar basic model. The
clause provides that the terms of the bilateral agreement apply
only to air carriers, the majority ownership and control of which
lies in the hands of citizens of the country party to the agree-
ment. This raises a problem of Community law because Article
52 of the European Treaty guarantees the "right of establish-
ment," that is any citizen of any Member State may establish,
own, or control a business entity in any Member State, and no
Member State may shape its own legal framework in a way bi-
ased against citizens of other Member States.' Thus, the Com-
mission identifies another adverse result of a process of
negotiation that pits the small constituents of the Community
against their giant transatlantic trade partner. In sum, that pro-
cess permits the United States something like a "divide and con-
quer" strategy, running against the goal of a unified internal
market in the Community.
II. COMMUNITY COMPETENCE: DIVISION OF
POWERS IN THE EU
Students of the United States federal system will recognize the
debate taking shape in Europe. How to divide competence be-
tween a federal central government and the governments of the
units of the federation (in the American case, the "several
states") has held center place in the legal and political history of
the United States. A similar debate, though with its own particu-
lar contours, is taking shape in Europe, the implications of
7 Id. at 2-7.
8 1992 O.J. (C224/21).
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which may prove substantial for trade relations between the EU
and the United States.
In the "Open Skies" cases, Member States took on obligations
toward the United States which have become part of the law of
those Member States concerning transatlantic air transport. As
such, the obligations undoubtedly have some impact on law, or at
least commerce, within the Community. Expressed in broad
terms, the question at issue is whether the impact impinges on
some area of Community competence-internal or external-in
ways that contravene the constitutionally-prescribed distribution
of powers between Community and Member States.
The Commission advances two related but distinct lines of ar-
gument against the Member States:
1) the Community has established its exclusive external compe-
tence on matters concerning air transport with third coun-
tries, and thus, the Member States are barred from
negotiating separately with third countries on those matters;
and
2) flowing from the AETRjudgment, the Community, exercising
an exclusive internal competence, has set forth common rules
governing in its entirety the internal aspect of air transport
policy, and therefore, the Member States no longer have the
right to "undertake obligations with third countries which af-
fect those rules."9
With respect to the first line of argument, much hinges on
whether the Community has determined through proper means
that a "necessity" exists to exercise an external competence on
air transport matters." "Necessity" in this sense is a touchstone,
defined in Opinion 1/76.11 Within the constitutional order of
the Community, according to Opinion 1/76, "necessity" can be
recognized only by the actual exercise of an external compe-
tence by the Community. 12 Once exercised, the competence be-
comes exclusive, that is, the individual Member States are then
barred from exercising it independently.13 But, before its exer-
cise, the competence cannot be "necessary", and thus, cannot be
exclusive. Opinions 2/92 and 1/94, according to the Advocate
General, emphasize this arrangement as well.' 4
9 Case 22/70, Coorn'n v. Council, 1971 E.C.R. 263.




14 See Case 2/92, 1995 E.C.R. 1-521; Case C-1/94, 1994 OJ. (C386/1).
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The Council, in the scheme of Community law institutional
relations, is responsible for determining whether to exercise the
external competence in question. The Commission repeatedly
has approached the Council to request a mandate of omnibus
scope to carry negotiations out on behalf of the Community
leading to an air transport agreement with the United States. In
June 1996, the Council granted the Commission only a limited
mandate that fell considerably short of the mandate requested.
The mandate allowed the Commission to negotiate with the
United States on a number of air transport matters but, explic-
itly, these matters did not include issues of market access, capac-
ity, carrier designation, and pricing. The external competence
that the Council determined was a "necessity" through its grant-
ing of a mandate thus had quite definite limits.
The Advocate General makes short work of a line of Commis-
sion argumentation concerning past findings of "necessity" in
connection with Community-level air transport agreements with
third countries other than the United States. "[T]he very fact
that the Council has behaved differently in this instance," the
Advocate General writes, "could be seen as a negative assess-
ment of the 'necessity' of the agreement with the United
States." 5
The Advocate General suggests that the proper course for the
Commission might have been to allege improper conduct on
the part of the Council rather than of individual Member States,
since the Member States acted properly in the absence of an
exclusive Community competence on the instant matter of ex-
ternal relations. 16
The Commission, in developing its second line of argument,
advances that two breaches occur when Member States negoti-
ated "Open Skies" agreements with the United States. First, the
agreements include "Fifth Freedom" rights-rights to operate
flights from the United States to a Member State and then be-
yond to another Member State (or vice versa). 7 Thus, a flight
might originate in Philadelphia, land in Brussels, and continue
on to Berlin-having picked up new passengers in Brussels.
The result is that a United States air carrier is operating an air
service on an intra-Community route, despite the lack of a Com-
munity agreement with the United States permitting such ser-
15 See Tizzano Opinion, supra note 1, para. 56.
16 See id. sec. B.
17 See id. para. 81.
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vice. Second, the "Open Skies" agreements contain
"nationality" clauses, excluding from their provisions air carriers
owned by citizens of third countries."8 Thus, an air carrier of
Belgian corporate citizenship but owned by citizens of other
Community Member States would be excluded from the bene-
fits of the Belgium-United States agreement in contravention,
the Commission argues, of the principles of a single market.
The ECJ in the AETRjudgment held that the exercise of the
Community's internal power, established by the Community
adopting common rules, makes exclusive a parallel external
competence over the relevant subject matter and takes from the
Member States the freedom to undertake obligations with third
countries which affect those rules."' The parties to the instant
case differ in their interpretation of this case law. The Member
States argue that the exclusive external competence means the
Member States may not make agreements with third countries if
those agreements conflict or potentially conflict with the com-
mon rules adopted. The Commission argues for a more expan-
sive interpretation, namely, that the exclusive external
competence means the Member States may not make agree-
ments with third countries on any matter falling within the same
sphere as that covered by the common rules whether or not the
agreements produce a substantive conflict.
According to the Advocate General, the Commission gets
AETR right; the Member States may not assume obligations that
"may even merely 'affect' the common rules. '20 However, the
Advocate General goes on to explain that it is not clear that the
Member States in the instant case have assumed an obligation
likely to "affect" the common rules.2 1 The Advocate General ex-
amines AETR and otherjudgments (Opinion 1/94 and Opinion
2/92) for guidance as to the question.22 A possible distinction
between the earlier cases and the instant case is that the com-
mon rules in question in the earlier cases contained express pro-
vision relating to negotiations with third countries or established
the complete harmonization of the relevant sphere. 21 The Opin-
ion emphasizes that "a specific assessment is required in each
18 See id. para. 118.
19 See Case 22/70, Comm'n v. Council, 1971 E.C.R. 263.
20 See Tizzano Opinion, supra note 1, para. 67.
21 Id. para. 68.
22 Id. para. 69.
23 Id.
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case to determine if the agreement conflicts in some respect
with the common rules. 24
In the guidance that the Advocate General provides for deter-
mining whether common rules have been "affected", a much
narrower principle is suggested than that developed in Ameri-
can constitutional case law from the Commerce Clause.25 "[I] t is
not enough," the Advocate General writes, "to cite general ef-
fects of an economic nature which the agreements could have
on the functioning of the internal market. '26 Instead, specific
and detailed indications are necessary, as to which Community
legislation would be prejudiced by the agreements. 27
III. COMMUNITY LEGISLATION POTENTIALLY
SUFFERING AETR 'AFFECTS' UNDER THE
DISPUTED AGREEMENTS
The Commission argues two pieces of Community legislation
that the Commission argues, would be prejudiced by the agree-
ments: Regulation 2407/92 (on licensing air carriers) and Regu-
lation 2408/92 (on access for Community air carriers to intra-
Community air routes) .2" The Advocate General doubts, how-
ever, whether the common rules established by the two Regula-
tions are common rules "affected" by the "Open Skies"
agreements. The Advocate General notes that the Regulations
contain no provision whatsoever concerning non-Community
air carriers. 29 Therefore, the agreements could not have directly
"affected" the common rules set forth in the Regulations:
[I] n the absence of Community legislation governing relations in
a given area with third countries, the disparities which could hy-
pothetically result from the conclusion of different international
agreements by Member States in that area and the economic
consequences that might ensue for the internal market do not in
themselves suffice to preclude the right of Member States to enter
into such agreements."
Regulations 2407/92 and 2408/92 say nothing about third
country air carriers, thus agreements with third countries about
air transport cannot "affect" the Regulations. In any event, the
24 Id. para. 75.
25 U.S. CONSTr. art. I § 8.
26 Tizzano Opinion, su/nra note 1, para. 77.
27 I.
21 Id. para 81.
29 Id. para 82.
311 Id. para 87.
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Advocate General proposes that whether the agreements "af-
fect" the Regulations, in the sense of "impinging on their cor-
rect application or altering their scope" is beside the point, for
the Commission adduces no evidence that they do.'
Though skeptical of much of the Commission's pleading, the
Advocate General finds that complaint against the Member
States might well be justified in two limited but not unimportant
fields.
Regulation 2409/92 provides that only Community air carri-
ers may introduce "new products or lower fares" on intra-Com-
munity air routes. 2 The Fifth Freedom rights, contained in the
agreements between Member States and the United States,
would allow American air carriers to set lower fares on intra-
Community routes. The agreements, in this respect, "affect" a
common rule of the Community and thus violate the Treaty.
Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Austria, and Germany, in their
agreements with the United States, provided that American air
carriers could not undersell Community carriers on intra-Com-
munity routes. However, such protection, however, does not sal-
vage this part of the agreements, for Community law is that any
"affect" is impermissible if it impinges on an exclusive external
competence, 3 the concept of exclusive external competence
precludes the Member States from taking on an obligation by
treaty or agreement, if the obligation even relates to the compe-
tence. Even if the obligation is substantively identical to the rel-
evant Community rule, it is no less an infringement.
Regulation 2299/89 establishes a code of conduct for comput-
erized reservation systems ("CRSs") and applies to third coun-
tries. 4 The Advocate General finds that the agreements may
"affect" that Regulation as well, and thus violate the Commu-
nity's external competence on the matter of CRS codes of
conduct. 5
IV. RIGHT OF ESTABLISHMENT AND
"NATIONALITY' CLAUSES
The Advocate General also takes the view that the "national-
ity" clauses violate the right of establishment, set forth in Article
31 Id. para 83.
32 Council Regulation 2409/92, art. 1, 1992 O.J. (L240/15) 3.
33 Tizzano Opinion, supra note 1, para. 67.
34 Council Regulation 2299/89, art. 7, 1989 O.J. (L220/1) 1, 2.
35 Tizzano Opinion, supra note 1, para. 104.
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52 of the European Treaty.36 The agreements allow the United
States to refuse route access to air carriers based in one of the
Member States with which a bilateral agreement is in force, but
owned or controlled by citizens of another Member State. Mem-
ber States, under Article 52, are obliged to give "national treat-
ment" to all businesses under their jurisdiction-that is, they
must treat all businesses as they treat businesses owned or con-
trolled by their own nationals. 7 According to the Advocate Gen-
eral, the bilateral agreements, although, strictly speaking, it is in
the United States that they vest a right to discriminate, poten-
tially place the Member States party to them in the position of
violating Article 52.38 The Opinion accepts the Commission's
view that the "nationality" clauses are contrary to Community
law. 3 9
V. COMMERCIAL AND OTHER IMPLICATIONS
Following the Opinion ofJanuary 31, 2002, the press declared
that the Advocate General's guidance previews commercially sig-
nificant changes in air transport relations between the United
States and the Member States in question." Notwithstanding
the importance of the Opinion, such assessments may well have
been premature.
The Advocate General's guidance, if it becomes the basis of
the final decision of the ECJ, might re-work in radical ways the
commercial reality of EU-United States air transport relations.
But it similarly leaves open, at least in the commercial dimen-
sion, the chance for continuity. The commercial outcome de-
pends on whether the ECJ, in its final judgment, takes a
narrowly circumscribed approach to correcting the flaws in the
disputed bilateral agreements, or a more expansive approach.
The Advocate General concluded that the Member States
were indeed within their competence when they agreed to grant
United States carriers the right to furnish intra-Community ser-
vice.41 The defect was in furnishing the United States carriers
'6 Id. para. 120-126.
37 Id.
38 Id.
, Id. para. 132.
0 See, e.g., Paulo Prada, EU Commission Wins Round in Opening Air Routes to U.S.;
Ruling Says Bilaterla Pacts Violate Union Law, WALL S-T.J. EUROPE, Feb. 1, 2002, at 1;
Barry James, Turbulance Ahead for 'Open Skies: Top EU Legal Aide Argues that U. S.
-European Air Pacts are Illegal, INT'L HE.ALDt TRIB., Feb. 1, 2002.
41 Tizzano Opinion, supra note 1, para. 44, 45.
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the right to introduce new products and set prices below those
charged by Community carriers. Much therefore depends on
the scope of the remedy that the ECJ prescribes in its final judg-
ment. A judgment that requires the Member States to de-
nounce in their entirety the disputed bilateral agreements will
have an immediate and substantial commercial impact. United
States air carriers will lose the international legal basis for their
transatlantic services to eight European countries, and the
United States government will have to set about in haste to
reach new agreements, if a serious disruption in air transport is
to be averted. The Advocate General hardly excludes that a to-
tal scrapping of the existing treaties might be necessary, and spe-
cifically draws attention to provisions concerning
denunciation.42 The Treaty addresses the problem of bilateral
international obligations that predate accession of a Member
State to the Treaty and that conflict with the common rules of
the Community.4 3 It also requires each Member State to address
the problem by seeking to re-negotiate the obligations.4 4 Denun-
ciation of agreements may be required when suitable re-negotia-
tion proves impossible.
On the other hand, the ECJ, in its final judgment, might find
a way to sever from the agreements those of their parts that con-
travene Community law. The "nationality" clauses are free-
standing language and conceivably could be removed without
wrecking the agreements as a whole. It would remain to be
seen, however, whether the United States would wish to remain
party to an agreement that permitted air carriers owned by citi-
zens of Member States not party to an "Open Skies" agreement
with the United States to have "Open Skies" levels of access to
the American air transport market. The United States, like most
sovereigns, has carefully regulated the right to ownership of air-
lines with access to its market, with majority ownership and con-
trol requirements commonplace. The granting of the privilege
of access to one country therefore cannot be assumed to evince
an intent to grant the same privilege to a carrier owned or con-
trolled by citizens of another country, even if the carrier, as a
legal entity, itself is a citizen of the country granted the
privilege.
42 Id.
43 Treaty Article 234, para. 2.
44 Id.
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The other aspect of the agreements that contravene Commu-
nity law and that would have to be removed are the products
and pricing implications associated with the Fifth Freedom
clauses. The Advocate General leaves unclear whether a change
is possible along these lines but does distinguish between a per-
missible result of the disputed agreements-access for United
States carriers to intra-Community routes-and an impermissi-
ble result-freedom to introduce new products and price ser-
vices on those routes below the rates charged by Community
carriers. The Advocate General is quite plain that Regulations
Nos. 2407/92 and 2408/92, governing access of Community air
carriers to intra-Community routes, in no way restrict Member
States from granting access to those routes to non-Community
air carriers. 45 A further Regulation, however, Regulation 2409/
92, provides that "[o] nly Community carriers shall be entitled to
introduce new products or lower fares than the ones existing for
identical products."4 The setting up of a common rule for the
Community on pricing and products by Regulation 2409/92 in
turn gives rise, under the rule of the ECJ judgment in AET, to
a "parallel" competence over external affairs.47 In other words,
the Community acquires, through the internal common rule es-
tablished by Regulation 2409/92, competence to regulate exter-
nal affairs to the extent necessary to preserve and effectuate the
internal common rule. The ECJ might well take the view that
that external competence is narrowly circumscribed in that it
reaches only the products and pricing issue; for the products
and pricing issue is the only relevant issue for which an internal
common rule of the Community exists, and thus, the only issue
possessing a basis for a relevant parallel external competence.
If it takes this circumscribed view, the ECJ could excise the
products and pricing elements from the disputed agreements,
leaving the Fifth Freedom (route access) clauses otherwise in-
tact. The Community rule on products and pricing would then
prevail in place of those elements of the bilateral agreement,
but the access to intra-Community routes created by the agree-
ment would remain.4" And, as a matter of practical commercial
45 Tizzano Opinion, supra note 1, para. 82.
413 Id. para. 89.
47 [cite]
48 A challenge may be presented, however, in attempting this severance. The
bilateral agreements provide expressly for Fifth Freedom rights. The products
and pricing liberties that they grant United States air carriers stem, it seems, by
implication from the Fifth Freedom rights. If in the agreements there is no readily
1068
AN END TO "DIVIDE AND CONQUER"?
application, the situation with regard to products and pricing
would remain unchanged. A Community rule would simply
take over the field from a Member State obligation under the
bilateral agreement and the Community rule that would sup-
plant the obligation is identical, or nearly identical, in substance
to the obligation. (Recall that the Member States incorporated
limits into the "Open Skies" agreements, so as to avoid results
contrary to the substance of the Community products and pric-
ing regulation.) In this scenario, the final judgment in the
"Open Skies" cases would work little change in the commercial
relations of United States air carriers to their European markets.
The constitutional nature of the case takes on commercial sig-
nificance here. Community law reaches the disputed agree-
ments through parallel external competence not a direct
exercise of external competence. In light of the twisting path
that brings the matter under Community purview, the Court
might well exercise some restraint in fashioning its remedy. A
circumscribed approach that permit the Member States to sal-
vage the route access provisions of the Fifth Freedom clauses,
would demonstrate that the Court recognizes the need for cau-
tion in attributing to the Community powers not explicit in ex-
isting law. It would also preserve, at least in part, existing
commercial relations.
However, under either a circumscribed or an expansive ap-
proach, the judgment likely will change the way the United
States negotiates with Community Member States on issues of
air transport. Advocate General Tizzano, in his analysis of Mem-
ber State responsibilities under the second paragraph of Article
234, is overtly critical of the approach taken to negotiations with
the United States.4" Article 234, second paragraph, requires
identifiable clause, distinct from the clause conferring Fifth Freedom rights, in
which the products and pricing liberties can be said to reside, then it may be
difficult to sever the products and pricing liberties from the Fifth Freedom. A
possible answer would be for the ECJ to require the Member States to seek nego-
tiation of side agreements clarifying that the matter of products and pricing is
governed by Community law and is in no way affected by anything express or
implied in the agreements themselves.
49 The Opinion also addresses the first paragraph of Treaty Article 234, which
allows a Member State to continue to honor some international obligations that
conflict with common Community rules, where those obligations pre-date acces-
sion by the Member State to the European Treaty. The Member States cite the
first paragraph of Article 234 and argue it renders the dispute bilateral agree-
ments permissible. The Advocate General would deny Article 234 exemption to
the nationality clauses in the disputed agreements. Treaty Article 234, para. 140.
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each Member State to "take all appropriate steps" to eliminate
"incompatibilities" between Community law and agreements
with third countries pre-dating accession to the European
Treaty. The provision also requires Member States to adopt a
"common attitude" vis-d-vis the third country, coordinating their
approach so as better to bring their external obligations in line
with Community law. The Advocate General states that the
Member States failed even to attempt to establish a "common
attitude. 5 ° If the ECJ takes this line up in its final judgment,
then part of the remedy in the "Open Skies" cases may well be
an injunction to re-open negotiations with the United States but
either at Community level or with the Member State respon-
dents moving forward as a single negotiating team. The contrast
to past United States-Member State negotiations, where the
United States has sat opposite individual European countries, is
clear enough. It seems inevitable under an injunction pursuant
to Article 234 that the dynamic of United States-European nego-
tiations in the air transport sector would change. The way might
be opened to a pairing of equals in an arena in which a heavy
weight has long prevailed.
51 Tizzano Opinion, supra note 1, para. 144.
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